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Abstract
This paper investigates the consequences of environmental tax reforms for unemployment and welfare,
in the case of developing countries with a large informal sector, rural-urban migration, and three different
assumptions about public spending: (1) as part of a revenue-neutral policy, (2) fixed, and (3) varying
endogenously. Under the indexation of unemployment benefits and informal-sector income that give rise
to a double dividend, a lower level of public spending is associated with a smaller negative impact on the
after-tax income of households and a higher increase in employment. These policies, however, still lead
to a reduction in social welfare; even more so in the case of endogenous public spending, although it is
associated with a higher increase in employment and a smaller reduction in private-sector incomes. The
model implies that complementary policy, in terms of lower public spending, is unlikely to be socially
acceptable, and does not support the case for a green tax reforms in developing countries.
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1 Introduction
Environmental tax reform is one of the most effective tools that can be used in a fundamental transformation
towards a green economy. When contemplating the introduction of environmental taxes, governments often
consider whether such taxes, besides helping to achieve environmental goals, should also play a larger role
in achieving other social and economic targets, such as reduction in unemployment rates. Previous studies,
however, found that policies that reduce unemployment rates tend to be costly in terms of other policy
objectives as they reduce private incomes, including those of people who are on state benefits2. This makes
it politically difficult to implement environmental policies. As a result, to make green tax reforms socially
acceptable, economists have argued that complementary policies such as public spending cuts could be
used to reduce the environmental tax burden on private sector income (see Koskela and Schob (1999) and
Bovenberg (1995)).
This paper evaluates the implications of this argument for unemployment and social welfare for the case
of developing countries. The theoretical framework features an economy with three sectors: urban formal,
urban informal, and rural agricultural. Following Pissarides (2000), search and matching frictions form the
distinction between formal, or “regulated” jobs, and informal, or “unregulated” jobs. Workers in the informal
sector search for jobs in the formal sector, and the unemployment rate is defined as the proportion of the
labour force that is in informal-sector self-employment. The economy imports both energy and capital at
given world prices to use as inputs in registered production activities.
I consider three public spending policies: (1) as part of a revenue-neutral policy, (2) fixed, and (3)
varying endogenously with GDP. As such, I study how various assumptions about public spending impact
the effects of environmental policies on unemployment and social welfare. In this way, I am also able to
compare the results with previous studies that have focused on revenue-neutral policies. Environmental
policies considered in the paper are in the form of increases in energy tax rates. The model is calibrated to
match some key aspects of labor markets in Mexico and is solved numerically.
The three main findings of the paper are as follows. First, I find that the income of agricultural workers
fall under all policy scenarios, even though they do not pay energy taxes. This is because the higher burden
of taxation imposed on the unemployed prompts them to escape the brunt of taxation by searching for a
job in the formal sector or by migrating into rural areas. This inflow of labor into the agricultural sector
pushes wages down in that sector. This is the key difference to previous studies of the double dividend in
the context of developed countries, as it shows the importance of modeling the Harris-Todaro effect (Harris
and Todaro (1970)) when measuring the incidence of higher energy taxation on poverty within the context
of developing countries.
Second, I establish that relative to the scenario of revenue-neutral public policy, environmental tax
policies with requirements on public spending, such as (2) and (3), are associated with a larger reduction in
the unemployment rate and a lower reduction in after-tax private income. Intuitively, since labor taxes have
a broad tax base, when public revenues are fixed there is less scope for the reduction of labor taxes under
a revenue-neutral policy compared with when public spending is fixed or if the level of revenues can adjust
endogenously. If it is also possible to reduce public spending, then the level of required public revenues
can decline by more, which creates extra budgetary room for a further reduction in labor taxes, prompting
an even larger increase in employment and a lower reduction in formal-sector after-tax income; in fact, the
2Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998a), Koskela and Schob (1999), Bovenberg (1995), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b).
3after-tax wage of formal workers increases in this case.
Third, I evaluate the welfare implications of two environmental tax reforms under a taxation scheme that
gives rise to a double dividend3, and under the assumption of either fixed or varying public spending. Public
spending is assumed to affect households’ utility. I find that a given environmental tax policy reduces overall
social welfare and the utility of each group of workers in the economy. The equivalent variation of a given
energy tax reform is lower when public spending varies endogenously compared to when public spending is
fixed, even though the former policy has a smaller negative impact on household incomes.
Finally, sensitivity analysis also reveals that even though a double dividend occurs in the model at the
expense of private-sector after-tax income, especially of those who are on state benefits, this result depends
critically on the expenditure share of energy when formal sector production is modeled with a standard
Cobb-Douglas function and a revenue-neutral green tax reform. Intuitively, with a smaller expenditure
share of energy, a decline in energy demand due to higher energy taxes reduces costs, or equivalently results
in a smaller tax burden.
These findings thus provide guidance to economists trying to garner support for the implementation
of environmental tax policies in developing countries. The model suggests that policymakers in developing
countries hoping to improve the labor market effects of environmental policies through lower public spending
will likely be unsuccessful, as public services are important determinants of households’ well-being in those
countries. These results should, however, be seen as highlighting this trade-off when implementing comple-
mentary policies aimed at improving the labor market effects of green tax reforms, rather than providing
conclusive proof of the incompatibility of green tax reforms with development and poverty alleviation policies
in less developed countries. The model abstracts from studying alternative ways of reducing the tax burden
on labor (which are beyond the scope of the current paper), which could be potentially more acceptable for
economic and political reasons. The results also emphasize the importance of modeling the features relevant
for developing countries when assessing consequences of environmental tax reforms in those countries.
More broadly, the results show that the context in which environmental taxation is introduced and the
package of complementary reform measures are extremely important, given developing countries’ emphasis
on the equity and distributional aspects of green policies. Developing countries are the most vulnerable to
climate change and resource depletion, and therefore need to embrace policies that help to stimulate economic
growth and to promote environmental sustainability, including environmental fiscal reforms. Specific green
growth instruments should be identified and used according to the context. This paper contributes to this
policy analysis by studying the implications of environmental fiscal reforms, accompanied with reduction in
public spending, for job creation and social welfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the search and matching model of an
economy with an informal sector and rural-urban migration. Section 3 outlines the parameterization of the
model. Section 4 discusses results of the policy experiments. Section 5 evaluates the welfare effects of green
tax reforms. Section 6 examines the sensitivity of these results to changes in the values of some parameters
and functional form. Section 7 concludes.
3This indexation scheme shifts the tax burden from workers to the unemployed (Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b),
Koskela and Schob (1999)). An alternative condition under which environmental policy benefits employment is if the tax
burden is shifted to capital owners or the owners of resources (see Bovenberg (1995) and Bovenberg (1999)).
42 Model
This section outlines the theoretical framework in which I conduct the analysis. The model is an extension
of the general equilibrium model of Satchi and Temple (2009), with a large informal sector and scope for
rural-urban migration, in an economy with a polluting production factor and environmental taxes.
The economy consists of two regions: urban and rural/agricultural, denoted by m and a respectively.
The urban sector is characterized by search and matching frictions in the tradition of Pissarides (2000),
which partitions the sector into informal/unregistered and formal/registered production activities. Workers
allocate themselves between the two sectors via rural-urban migration. Once workers migrate from rural
areas, they first enter the informal urban sector.
There are two types of firms: agricultural (rural) sector firms and registered urban-sector firms. Firms
operating in rural areas produce goods for consumption in that region only and operate under perfect
competition. The economy imports both energy and capital at given world prices, and both are inputs into
registered production activities only4. In the informal sector, workers are assumed to be self-employed and
engage in low-productivity labor-intensive tasks. Goods from formal and informal production activities are
assumed to be perfect substitutes.
Throughout the paper, I use the term “unemployed” to describe people self-employed in the informal
sector, and thus treat the fraction of informal sector workers in the urban labor force as the unemployment
rate, u, so that the size of population normalized to 1 is decomposed into:
La + (1− u)Lm + uLm = 1 (1)
where La and Lm are the sizes of agricultural and urban sectors, respectively. Consistent with the Harris-
Todaro model, all workers are assumed to be risk-neutral. Finally, revenues collected from taxing energy
and labor are used to provide general government goods and transfers to the unemployed.
2.1 Agricultural sector
The agricultural sector is modeled as subsistence agriculture, assuming that it does not use energy as an
input into production, so capital and labor are the only production factors. As in Satchi and Temple (2009),
agricultural capital, Ka, is interpreted as land. In this sector, each worker produces an output g(ka) =
Ya
La
,
where Ya is total agricultural production in the economy and ka is the capital to labor ratio, defined as:
ka =
Ka
La
(2)
The worker is paid a wage wa, and derives positive utility from living in a rural area, χa > 0
5. The
agricultural sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive, which implies that:
wa = g(ka)− g′k(ka)ka (3)
where g′k(ka) = ra is the rental cost of capital in the agricultural sector.
4This is a simplification; Kuralbayeva (forthcoming) considers the case when the agricultural sector uses energy as a pro-
duction input to model the presence of pervasive electricity subsidies in the agricultural sector.
5The labor force is homogeneous in terms of their preferences, so the parameter χa is the same for all workers. It is also
conceivable that workers derive negative utility from living in a rural area, that is, χa < 0. In that situation, the wage rate in
the agricultural sector must be high enough to attract labor from urban areas in order to equate the returns on working in the
rural area and working in the urban area informal sector, as will be discussed in Section 2.3 below.
52.2 The urban labor market
Urban sector goods can be produced from either formal or informal activities. Labor market search-and-
matching frictions form the distinction between the production activities of formal goods and informal goods.
2.2.1 The labor market
In formal labor markets, a constant-returns-to-scale matching function Mt determines the number of new
matches between job searchers and vacancies:
Mt = m(suLm, vLm,M) = M(suLm)
γ(vLm)
1−γ (4)
where uLm denotes the number of unemployed workers, s is the average search intensity, vLm is the number
of open vacancies, and M denotes matching efficiency. Using linear homogeneity of the matching function,
it is possible to express contact rates for firms and workers as a function of a single variable θ, defined as:
θ =
v
su
(5)
which measures the labor market tightness. Consequently, the probability of one vacancy being filled is:
q ≡ Mt
vLm
= M
(su
v
)γ
= Mθ−γ (6)
and 1/q is the expected duration of a vacancy. Note that q(θ) is a decreasing function of θ, and I define the
elasticity of q with respect to θ as εθ ≡ −q′(θ)θ/q > 0. Each match between a worker and firm in the formal
sector is assumed to be destroyed by an exogenous Poisson rate λ, and the law of motion for the number of
unemployed satisfies the following condition:
˙uLM = Lm(λ(1− u)− suθq(θ)) (7)
where Lmλ(1− u) is the number of separations and Lmsuθq(θ) is the number of hires. In the steady state,
the inflows and outflows of employment in the informal sector must balance:
λ(1− u) = suθq(θ) (8)
and this determines the relationship between the unemployment rate and the rate of vacancies (labor market
tightness) i.e. the Beveridge curve.
2.2.2 The worker’s expected gains
In the informal sector, each worker receives z+b−σ(s; z), where z denotes the labor productivity (output) of
each worker6, b denotes unemployment benefits, and σ(s; z) represents formal job search costs, which depend
on search intensity s and labor productivity z. I consider different arrangements concerning the taxation of
unemployment benefits and characteristics of the informal labor market by discussing specifications of b and
z in Section 2.2.5.
6This is a simple specification, which abstracts from modeling how various production factors (energy, capital, and labor)
are used in the informal sector production process. Thus we cannot examine the effects of tax policy that operate through the
relative energy intensities of the formal sectors and the informal sector. However, those effects could be important in reducing
the costs of energy tax reforms through an expansion of the tax base (see, Bento et al. (2012)).
6I use U and W to denote the value to the worker of being unemployed (and searching for a formal job) and
being employed on a formal job, respectively. As the ex-post value of working in formal jobs is the highest,
there is an incentive to search for jobs in the formal segment of the urban sector. Informal sector workers
decide how actively they search for a formal sector job. A worker i, who searches for a job with intensity
si, when all other workers search with the same level of intensity s, has a matching rate proportional to his
relative search intensity si/s:
q¯i =
si
suLm
m(suLm, vLm) = siqθ = siMθ
1−γ (9)
Following Satchi and Temple (2009), the optimal level of search intensity for worker i is determined by
equating the worker’s marginal search costs (σsi) with the expected benefits dq¯i/dsi(W − Ui) of job search,
and then by imposing symmetry:
σ′s(s; z) = θq(W − U) (10)
while every job searcher finds a job at rate sqθ.
The expected utilities of being unemployed and employed at a formal job can be defined as follows:
rU = z + b− σ + sqθ(W − U) (11)
rW = wm + λ(U −W + P ), (12)
where wm is the formal-sector wage and P is the severance payment paid by the firm to a departing employee.
2.2.3 Firms and labor demand
I use V and J to denote the value to the firm of holding a vacancy and a filled job, respectively. I assume that
firms pay a flow cost c to post a vacancy. Once the vacancy is filled, each firm employs one worker who is
paid the wage wm, rents capital km from international capital markets, and imports the polluting production
factor energy em at an exogenously given price pE . Firms are liable to energy and payroll taxes. Matches
between workers and firms break at an exogenous Poisson rate λ, at which point the worker returns to the
informal sector. The firm makes a severance payment P to the departing employee, which is an important
feature of labor markets in developing countries such as Mexico.
Each operating firm with its one employee thus produces the output Amf(km, em), where Am is a TFP
parameter and f(km, em) is the intensive form of production technology, with capital (km) and energy utilized
per worker (em), so that:
rJ = Amf(km, em)− (1 + τL)wm − rmkm − pE(1 + τe,m)em − λ(J + P ), (13)
rV = −c+ q(J − V ), (14)
The first-order conditions for the capital-labor ratio and energy-labor ratio are:
Amf
′
k(km, em) = rm;Amf
′
e(km, em) = pE(1 + τe,m) (15)
which imply that:
rJ = y(km, em)− (1 + τL)wm − λ(J + P ) (16)
7where labor productivity is defined as:
y(km, em) ≡ Amf(km, em)− rmkm − pE(1 + τe,m)em.
Free entry into the creation of vacancies implies V = 0, that is:
J =
c
q
(17)
which states that in equilibrium, the expected profit from a job has to cover the expected cost of a vacancy.
By combining equations (16) and (17) to eliminate J , and assuming that hiring costs are a fixed proportion
ν of the producer wage in the formal sector, c = ν(1 + τL)wm, I can obtain the following expression:
y(km, em) = (1 + τL)wm
[
1 + (λ+ r)
ν
q
]
+ λP (18)
which states that labor productivity equals total labor costs, including wage costs, the expected capitalized
value of its hiring costs, and expected severance payments.
2.2.4 Wage determination
Search and matching frictions in the formal urban sector imply that each match gives rise to a surplus that
is shared between the firm and its worker through a generalized Nash bargain, which determines wages in
formal urban sector according to7:
wm ∈ arg max
wm
(W − U)β(J − V )1−β (19)
where β and 1 − β correspond respectively to the workers’ and firms’ bargaining strength. The first-order
condition for this problem can be written as:
(1− β)(1 + τL)(W − U) = βJ (20)
If workers dominate the bargaining process i.e. β → 1, it is clear from equation (20) that their value to the
firm, J , will be equal to zero and the marginal product of labor equals the costs of labor (including expected
severance pay), (1 + τL)wm + λP = y(km, em). If, however, the firm holds the entirety of the bargaining
power i.e. β = 0, then W = U . This simply means that formal sector wages equal workers’ reservation wage,
wm + λP = z + b− σ.
Using (11), (12), and (17) to eliminate W − U and J respectively from (20), I can obtain the following
expression for the wage rate:
wm − (z + b− σ)
wm
+
λP
wm
=
β
1− β ν
(
r + λ
q
+ sθ
)
. (21)
This expression shows that the higher the bargaining power of workers (β), the larger is formal sector income
(including expected severance pay). A higher interest rate (r), a larger separation rate (λ), or a tighter labor
market (θ) raise the rents from a job match and thus raise the wage.
Using (10), (17), and (20), I can rewrite the equation that determines the optimal level of search intensity
as:
σ′s =
β
1− β θνwm. (22)
7This type of solution, under some conditions, may be justified by application of strategic bargaining theory; see Binmore
et al. (1986) and Rogerson et al. (2005).
82.2.5 Unemployment benefits and informal sector labor productivity
As discussed in the introduction, one of the conditions for the double dividend in employment to arise
is that the tax burden is shifted from workers to recipients of income transfers. This condition critically
depends on how green tax reforms affect unemployment benefits (the outside option of employees in the Nash
bargaining process) (see Koskela and Schob (1999) and Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b)). In particular,
if unemployment benefits are indexed to consumer prices, then the purchasing power of the unemployed is
fixed in real terms. In this situation, the environmental tax reform cannot shift the tax burden from workers
to the unemployed, reducing the scope for a double dividend. If, however, the ratio of unemployment
compensation to wages is fixed, then the unemployed also share the burden of carbon taxation. By shifting
the tax burden away from workers towards the unemployed, employment may expand8.
Koskela and Schob (1999) illustrates these insights in a model of wage-bargaining between unions and
employers and with environmental taxes on the consumption of ‘dirty’ goods, while Bovenberg and van der
Ploeg (1998b) employ a job search framework and consider environmental taxes in production. The latter
also allows for the unemployed to derive (untaxed) income from informal activities. Both papers demonstrate
that the potential for double dividend critically depends on the manner in which unemployment benefits are
linked to wages and prices. Since the focus of the paper is to analyze how the reduction in public consumption
can moderate the costs of green tax reforms on real after-tax private income under conditions that a double
dividend arises, the theoretical framework must include elements that cause income in unemployment to be
imperfectly linked to the wage level.
As in Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b), I consider environmental taxes in production and model the
informal sector, and choose similar indexation schemes for unemployment income, summarized in Cases A
and C:
Case A Unemployment benefits are fixed at a given level (b = b¯). I similarly assume that workers earn a
fixed amount of income by engaging in informal activities (z = z¯). Since the set up of this model is static
and the price of consumption goods is normalized to unity, under this tax regime, the purchasing power of
unemployed is fixed in real terms.
Case C Unemployment benefits are assumed to represent some fraction of formal-sector earnings such that
b = pibwm and z = piz(1 + τL)wm. This indexation rule suggests that labor taxes are evaded in the informal
sector, but energy taxes are not. This is a plausible assumption, since pre-existing taxes, such as taxes on
labor, tend to be easier to evade than certain forms of environmental taxes, such as carbon taxes or taxes
on energy (see, e.g., Liu (2013)).
In addition, I introduce case B, an intermediate case between cases A and C:
Case B I slightly modify the rule of case C, relaxing the assumption that labor taxes are evaded in the
informal sector and assuming that z = pizwm, while unemployment benefits are linked to wages (b = pibwm,
8The importance of this benefit regime for the effects of generic (non-green) tax reform on employment has been also
demonstrated, for instance, by Pissarides (1998). He has found that the effects of employment tax cuts are mainly on wages
if the ratio of unemployment compensation to wages is fixed, while there are substantial employment effects if unemployment
compensation is fixed in real terms.
9as in Case C). This indexation rule implies that the income of the unemployed moves in line with that of
employed workers.
There are potentially many other indexation schemes (see Koskela and Schob (1999) or Bovenberg and
van der Ploeg (1994)), with environmental (or other) tax reforms exerting different impacts on income from
unemployment. The chosen cases A and C represent two extreme and opposing cases when the green tax
reform cannot affect unemployment income or can shift the brunt of the tax burden on the unemployed,
respectively. These cases are also supported by stylized facts on benefit indexation schemes currently present
in some Latin American countries, as discussed in Section 2.2.6.
Finally, in contrast to Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b), I simulate the model, which enables me to
perform extensive quantitative analysis. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b) focus on a revenue-neutral
tax policy, while I focus on environmental tax policies that do not have to be revenue-neutral but instead
allow public revenues and public consumption to change in response to a tax reform. I discuss this further
when introducing the government budget constraint in Section 2.4.
2.2.6 Unemployment insurance systems in Latin American countries: a short overview
In this section, I provide a short overview of the unemployment insurance schemes in a selected group of
Latin American countries9, which is summarized in Table 1.
In most countries, unemployment benefits are tied to earnings, with minimum and maximum thresholds.
For instance, in Chile, benefits are decreasing fraction of renumeration, with 50% of salary being paid in the
first month, 45% in the second and so on. A similar descending pattern is also in place in Argentina and
Uruguay. In Ecuador, the unemployed receive a one-off lump-sum payment upon leaving employment.
Mexico, on the other hand, does not have a nationwide unemployment insurance scheme, but there is still
a social security system10 in place that allows registered workers to withdraw a maximum of 30 days worth
of their pension savings from their individual account once every 5 years, in the event of unemployment.
Furthermore, temporary employment programs are in place for workers from rural areas (with benefits being
set at 99% of the local minimum wage), and in order to deal with the weak coverage of the official social
security system (less than 50% of workers) , a program named Seguro Popular (SP) was introduced in
2002, providing workers with health but not employment benefits. In addition, Mexico City launched its
own unemployment benefit scheme in 2007 (Programa seguro de desempleo del distrito federal). Under this
scheme, benefits are restricted to 6 months, and the monthly benefit is worth of 30 days of minimum wage.
The existing Mexican programs described above have features that resemble flat-rate systems.
Overall, the stylized facts presented in Table 1 provide evidence for and support the flat-rate system
and earnings-related indexation scheme of benefits11 which characterize the cases outlined in the previous
section.
9Some forms of unemployment insurance (UI) currently exist in a handful of developing countries (see Vodopivec (2013),
Velasquez (2010) and Gerard and Gonzaga (2012)), most of them Latin American countries.
10See: http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.do?tid=2667.
11It is important to note that even though in some countries, unemployment benefits are earnings-related and descending
depending on the duration of unemployment, I do not model such unemployment insurance schemes. However, the labor
economics literature has hazard rate models that deal with these types of unemployment schemes.
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2.3 Urban-rural migration
There is scope for migration between urban and rural areas, and once workers migrate from rural areas,
they initially enter the informal sector. Migration involves a cost φf |f |, where φf represents the congestion
effect caused by migration intensity12 , and f represents migration flows from the agricultural sector to the
cities (a negative sign would imply a migration flow in the opposite direction). The migration equilibrium
condition is defined as follows:
wa + χa + rφff = rU (23)
and it states that the discounted value of being employed in the agricultural sector must be equal to the
workers’ expected utility from entering the informal sector. The steady-state is characterized by zero migra-
tion flows (f = 0) and workers are indifferent between staying in agriculture and the informal urban sector:
wa + χa = z + b+ σ[εσ − 1] (24)
where εσ = sσ
′(s)/σ is the elasticity of search costs with respect to s. The equation states that an increase
in unemployment benefits and informal-sector income attracts more labor from the agricultural sector to the
informal sector, thus driving up agricultural-sector wages. An increase in search intensity naturally entails a
rise in search costs, but also increases the probability of finding a job in the formal sector. Thus, when the
expected benefits from search (σεσ = sσ
′(s)) exceed the costs (σ(s)), workers migrate from the agricultural
to the informal sector, causing an increase in rural wages.
2.4 The government’s budget constraint
The government’s main commitments are the provision of public goods G and transfers to the unemployed:
G+ uLmb = τLwm(1− u)Lm
(
1 + ν
r + λ
q
)
+ τe,mpEem(1− u)Lm (25)
Goods produced in the formal and informal sectors are assumed to be perfectly substitutable13, and govern-
ment consumption is restricted to these types of goods. Government revenue includes revenues from taxing
energy in the formal sector τe,mpEem(1− u)Lm, total payroll taxes paid by employees in the formal sector,
τLwm(1− u)Lm, and taxes on capitalized recruitment costs, τLwm(1− u)Lmν(r + λ)/q.
I examine the effects of green tax policy on labor market outcomes by solving the parametrized model
numerically and performing policy experiments along two dimensions. In one dimension, as outlined above,
there are the various cases of taxation regimes. In the second dimension, there are different modeling assump-
tions that can be made about government expenditure, G. First, I assume that government expenditure,
defined as a fraction of GDP (G = ψY , Y = Ya + Ym), varies endogenously. Second, I also consider the
case when the level of government expenditure is fixed at its baseline level, i.e. G = G¯. Finally, I examine a
revenue-neutral policy under which the government budget constraint will be replaced by two equations:
G+ uLmb = Υ (26)
12Migration from rural to urban areas makes it more difficult for workers in the informal sector to find formal-sector jobs,
undermining the relative attractiveness of being in the informal urban sector.
13This is a common assumption introduced in the literature to model the coexistence of both formal and informal sectors,
see Pigott and Whalley (2001), Keen (2008), and Bento et al. (2012).
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and
Υ = τLwm(1− u)Lm
(
1 + ν
r + λ
q
)
+ τe,mpEem(1− u)Lm, (27)
where Υ is total government revenue in the baseline case with energy taxes at τe,m = 0.15.
3 Parameterization
Since this model is designed to examine the effects of environmental policies on labor market outcomes, a
primary target of the calibration is to produce reasonable figures for labor market characteristics such as the
size of the informal sector, agricultural employment, and average employment duration14. I calibrate the
parameter values using the latest available official data and values similar to existing studies that analyze
labor market policies in Mexico (or Latin American countries which share many similar labor characteristics
with Mexico). The baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 2; Table 3 reports the characteristics
of the labor market implied by the theoretical model as well as the corresponding values from Mexican data.
The time period is assumed to be one month.
3.1 Matching and labor market parameters
The matching technology is Cobb-Douglas and satisfies m(sv, u) = M(su)γv1−γ . I set the value of γ equal
to 0.5, which is commonly accepted value in the literature15. I set the values of M and s at 0.1 and 0.5
respectively in order to yield a plausible value for the duration of employment (see Table 3). I assume β to
be equal to 0.5, as it is again accepted by most of the literature16. The value of parameter ν in the vacancy
posting cost (c = ν(1+τL)wm) is set at 0.4
17. Following Satchi and Temple (2009), I assume that the average
severance payment P is four times the wage, which along with the assumption that P = zP (1 + τL)wm,
yields a value of zp = 3.36.
I assume the annual interest rates r and rm to be equal to 4%, which is the value used in the literature
(Satchi and Temple (2009), Albrecht et al. (2009)). The monthly job separation rate, λ, is chosen to be at 0.04,
as in Gerard and Gonzaga (2012), who base their estimate on monthly data for Brazil. In comparison, Satchi
and Temple (2009), using quarterly estimates from Gong and van Soest (2002), calibrate λ at 0.06. I decide
to set λ to 0.04, which allows me to match the labor data statistics of Mexico better. The parameterization
yields an “unemployment” rate (the size of the informal sector as a share of non-agricultural employment)
of 30.63%. This number is very close to the official estimate of 34.1% for Mexico (2009 Q2 )18.
3.2 Search intensity, labor income and government
Following Satchi and Temple (2009), the cost of search intensity function is defined as follows:
σ(s) = Πzsφ. (28)
14This section draws heavily on a corresponding one in Kuralbayeva (forthcoming)
15See Pissarides (1998), Satchi and Temple (2009), and Zenou (2008).
16See, e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Zenou (2008), Albrecht et al. (2009), and Pissarides (1998).
17For comparison, Satchi and Temple (2009) set the ratio c/wm equal to 0.4.
18This share also includes those who have a formal job. Formal employment in the informal sector, however, only represents
a very small fraction of non-agricultural employment. For illustration, I also compute informal-sector employment as a share
of non-agricultural employment, using data (ILO (2012)) on the number of people in informal employment and the number of
people in informal employment outside the informal sector. The estimate is 33.5%.
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I set the value of φ at 2 (as in Satchi and Temple (2009)), and choose the value of parameter Π to generate
plausible values for both informal-sector productivity and the total income of the unemployed. The agricul-
tural employment share, La, is chosen to be equal to 0.13
19, which matches the annual data for Mexico in
2010. The value of χa is then inferred from the model’s migration equation (24).
I assume the payroll tax rate τL to be equal to 0.25, since 2013 OECD data on the average labor income
tax (tax wedge) faced by Mexican workers suggests 19.0% and an average compulsory payment wedge of
26.9%20. At the same time, payroll taxes may make up a maximum 35% of the payroll in Mexico (see
Handbook (2012)). The values for the payroll tax rate used in the literature differ considerably - for instance
Satchi and Temple (2009) use a value of 0.1, whilst Albrecht et al. (2009) use a value of 0.5. Since there is
no consensus in the literature, I have chosen a payroll tax rate that is in line with recent data on Mexico. I
assume the baseline energy tax, τe,m, to be equal to 0.15, which together with other parameters allow me to
match the share of public consumption in GDP quite well. Specifically, I assume that government spending
accounts for 10% of GDP (i.e., ψ = 0.1), which is consistent with the empirical evidence for Mexico. The
average share of general government final consumption expenditure in GDP from 2004-2008 is 10%, which
is similar to the 11.4% share over the past few decades (1991-2013)21.
3.3 Production functions
The baseline production technologies in the formal and agricultural sectors are Cobb-Douglas and satisfy:
Ym = AmK
α1
m E
1−α1−α2
m ((1− u)Lm)α2 ; Ya = AaKγ1a L1−γ1a ; (29)
which in intensive forms are respectively defined as follows:
Amf(km, em) = Amk
α1
m e
1−α1−α2
m ; g(ka) = Aak
γ1
a (30)
Cobb-Douglas technology has been used widely (e.g. in Golosov et al. (2014), Barrage (2012), and references
therein), and, as argued by Hassler et al. (2012), seems to be a reasonable representation of energy input use
for a longer time horizon. I focus on the case of an open capital account for developing countries, assuming
that the economy is open to international capital flows so that the return to capital is equal to the world
interest rate. In addition, given that the price of energy is determined internationally by world markets,
equations (15) imply that both km and em are exogenously given. This version of the model can be seen as
capturing long-run adjustment, and thus the Cobb-Douglas specification is consistent with this assumption.
I test the sensitivity of the results to a CES production function specification, which is considered to be
a better representation of energy demand in the short-and-medium term than a Cobb-Douglas production
function (see, e.g. Hassler et al. (2012)), assuming instead that formal sector production is given by:
Yt = [(1− γ2)[AtKαt ((1− u)Lt)1−α]
ε−1
ε + γ2[A
E
t Et]
ε−1
ε ]
ε
ε−1 (31)
19Please note that given this parameterization, the agricultural sector is a proxy for the rural area and thus in the paper, the
terms agricultural sector and rural area will be used interchangeably.
20See http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/taxingwages-mexico.htm. The average compulsory payment wedge measures the
payroll taxes and non-tax compulsory payments.
21General government final consumption expenditure (% of GDP) (NE.CON.GOVT.ZS) from the World Bank World Devel-
opment Indicators includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of
employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security, but excludes government military expenditures
that are part of government capital formation.
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where L is labor, At the capital/labor-augmenting technology (later called Am), A
E the fossil-energy-
augmenting technology,  the elasticity of substitution between capital/labor and fossil energy, and γ2 is
a share parameter.
For the baseline Cobb-Douglas technology specification (29), I set the values of the parameters as α1 =
0.269, α2 = 0.5, and γ1 = 0.63 (as in Satchi and Temple (2009)). For the nested CES production function
(31), I set the values of the parameters of the production function as α = 0.3, ε = 0.0522, and γ2 = 0.1
23.
The values of the exogenous price of energy and augmenting technology are chosen to match the labor data
statistics, so that the baseline values for both production function specifications are the same.
These shares give a baseline share of energy costs in total production of 23.1%. For comparison, a value
of 40.7% is an estimate based on a Cobb-Douglas specification used in an analysis of the energy-saving
effects of technological progress in Chinese industry, which is characterized by high energy intensity (see
Yuan et al. (2009)). The estimates of 35% and 17% are the values of energy input per unit of value added in
non-metallic mineral products and paper products respectively across developing countries (see Upadhyaya
(2010)). Much lower values for the expenditure share of energy have also been used in recent macroeconomic
models of climate change (see Golosov et al. (2014) or Barrage (2012)) of 1 − α1 − α2 = 0.03. Since, the
focus of this analysis is on developing countries, I start with a higher energy intensity of production than
used in those studies and perform sensitivity analyses using other values of 1− α1 − α2. I demonstrate that
the key results of the paper remain robust to changes in the values of energy intensity.
As Ka represents a fixed factor in agricultural production, I can normalize its value to one without loss of
generality. Thus, given the knowledge of La, this pins down the value of land per worker in the rural sector,
ka = 1/La. In choosing the values of productivity parameters Am and Aa, I draw on a recent study by Gollin
et al. (2014), who demonstrate that by adjusting for different factors such as human capital per worker, the
productivity gap between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in developing countries, measured as
value added per worker, could be estimated at around 2. Accordingly, by normalizing the agricultural-sector
productivity to one, Aa=1, I set the value of Am at 2.
3.4 Other parameters
I have verified that the conditions of the model (1) wm + λP > z+ b− σ and (2) P < wm/λ hold under this
parametrization. The first condition states that workers will only engage in job search if it is worthwhile,
that is, the expected return from a formal job is greater than the return from being in the informal sector and
searching for a formal job. The second condition implies that the (expected) severance payment P accounts
for less than half of expected labor income from employment.
To perform welfare analysis, the households’s utility function is defined as follows:
U(I) = cαAA cαMM Gϑ (32)
where αA + αM = 1. I assume ϑ = 0.1, which is below the values of 0.4 and 0.2 considered in Ganelli and
22The value of the elasticity ε = 0.05 (or below), as shown by Hassler et al. (2012), implies the sensible energy-saving and
capital-labor saving technology series. Their estimates also suggest that these technology trends are positive and of very similar
magnitude, so I therefore set A = AE .
23Empirical estimates of the share of energy in production (γ2) vary by industry. For example, Dissou et al. (2012) find that
the value of γ2 varies between 0.024 (transportation equipment) and 0.186 (primary metals). I set the value of γ2 in the range
of these estimates, close to estimates of the energy share in non-metal mineral products or chemicals.
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Tervala (2007) and Sims and Wolff (2014) respectively24. I set the value of αA at 0.3.
4 Discussion of the results
4.1 Policy experiments
For clarity, I again briefly outline the experiment specifications I conduct in the paper, which have been
explained in the previous sections. First, I examine the effects of green tax reforms when the total income
of the unemployed is fixed in real terms (Case A: b = b¯, z = z¯). Second, I assume that the income of the
unemployed is a fixed proportion of after-tax wages (Case B: b = pibwm, z = pizwm). Third, I study the
case where the income of the unemployed is fixed, but labor taxes are evaded in the informal sector (Case
C: b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm).
Cases A and B are analyzed under the assumption that the provision of public goods is constant (G = G¯).
Case C is considered under three assumptions about public expenditure: (1) fixed public spending (G = G¯),
(2) flexible (endogenous) public spending (G = ψY , Y = Ya + Ym), and (3) a revenue-neutral tax reform.
Case C is the type of unemployment indexation rule under which the environmental tax policy can affect
the income of the unemployed and can shift the tax burden from the workers to unemployed, so the double
dividend can arise. By making different assumptions about public spending, I see how changes in public
consumption impact private-sector employment and after-tax income.
4.2 Green tax policies: All policy scenarios
In this section, I distill the results and key insights from all five policy experiments outlined in this paper.
I study the effects of an environmental tax policy that doubles the value of the energy tax from its baseline
value of τe,m = 0.15 to τe,m = 0.3. An increase in energy taxes affects the economy through two channels.
First, it decreases energy demand, which in turn decreases the energy tax base. Second, lower energy demand
reduces labor productivity and thus labor demand. If the government needs to maintain overall tax revenues,
the erosion of the energy tax base prevents the government from reducing labor taxes sufficiently to offset
these adverse effects of higher energy taxes on labor productivity, as green taxes have a narrower tax base
than labor taxes. Since a reduction in payroll taxes does not fully offset the adverse effects of the pollution
tax, the overall tax burden on labor tends to rise. The higher average tax burden on labor generally reduces
private-sector after-tax income and raises the labor costs (per unit of output) for firms, and thus tends to
reduce labor demand and employment. By lowering the tax burden on labor, or as discussed in this paper,
by shifting the tax burden on the unemployed, it is possible to raise employment. However, such an outcome
depends on the indexation scheme of income in unemployment, and the extent to which the after-tax income
of all labor is reduced by the type of government expenditure policy, which I discuss below.
Table 4 summarizes the effects of an increase in energy taxes on key labor market characteristics, under
different policy scenarios. Labor market characteristics include the unemployment rate (u), after-tax real
income of the private sector (formal sector wage, wm), income of the unemployed (b+ z), rural sector wages
(wa), search efforts (s), and labor market tightness (θ). From this table we see that, for instance, the first
green tax policy is associated with an increase in the unemployment rate of 0.75 percentage points, a 1.63%
24In section 5 below I discuss how a higher value of ϑ affects the baseline results.
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decline in after-tax wages, a 3.83% decrease in agricultural wages, and a decline in both search efforts and
labor market tightness, while unemployment income is unaffected.
The table first demonstrates that a double dividend (a decline in the unemployment rate) occurs when
the additional tax burden associated with higher carbon taxation is shifted onto the unemployed, as in the
last three experiments. In the first policy experiment, the income of the unemployed remains unaffected by
green tax policy. In turn, the tax burden of environmental protection is borne by workers in the remaining
sectors of the economy (urban formal and agricultural), in terms of lower urban-sector employment and
lower formal- and agricultural-sector income. Intuitively, as the outside option available to workers remains
unaffected by green tax policy, this policy effectively raises the bargaining power of workers. Workers thus
resist large cuts in after-tax wages, increasing labor costs and reducing formal-sector employment. A decrease
in formal-sector employment is partially absorbed by the agricultural sector; the inflow of labor into rural
areas pushes down agricultural-sector wages.
Under the second policy experiment, with indexation to after-tax wages, the environmental tax policy
decreases the income of the unemployed, enabling the government to reduce taxes on labor by more than
under the previous scenario, moderating the rise in labor costs and the reduction in employment. As the
unemployed now bear some of the costs of a cleaner environment, the adjustment to the additional tax burden
triggers a smaller decline in employment and in incomes of workers in both the formal and agricultural sectors
compared to the first experiment. Both formal sector wages and the total income of the unemployed fall by
the same amount (1.33%) when carbon taxes are increased from 15% to 30%. This reduction still proves to
be insufficient for a double dividend to occur. Instead, green tax reforms only result in a lower unemployment
rate when the additional tax burden due to higher energy taxes is shifted more onto the unemployed (the
last three policy experiments).
The double dividend from the third policy experiment, which was not present in the second scenario,
is due to the assumption in the former case that payroll taxes do not affect informal-sector income from
self-employment. Under that assumption, a shift from labor taxes towards carbon taxes has a heavier impact
on the income of the unemployed from informal activities. Since z represents 93% of the total income of the
unemployed in the baseline case with τe,m = 0.15, the environmental tax policy that replaces an explicit tax
on labor with an implicit tax on labor (energy tax) results in a bigger fall in the income of the unemployed
than under previous policy experiments, with their income falling by 4.58% compared with 1.33% under the
previous policy experiment. A larger decline in the outside option weakens workers’ bargaining power, which
prompts them to accept lower wages. This boosts labor demand and reduces unemployment.
Finally, a comparison of the results across the third, fourth, and fifth policy experiments reveals that
under the same tax regime, by varying the level of public revenues and government consumption, the impact
of a green tax reform on labor markets can be improved: after-tax income in the private sector is highest
under the last experiment. To explain the differences in these outcomes, I first note that when τe,m = 0.3,
the level of government revenues is 0.7386, 0.7307, and 0.7099, while the level of public spending is 0.6618,
0.6581, and 0.6321 for the third, fourth, and fifth policies respectively. Since labor taxes have a broad tax
base, when government revenues are fixed there is less scope for reducing labor taxes under a revenue-neutral
policy, compared to when public spending is fixed but the level of revenues can change. If, in addition, public
spending can also be reduced, it is possible to create extra budgetary room for a further reduction in payroll
taxes, inducing a further increase in formal-sector after-tax income.
It is also important to note that agricultural workers bear a large share of the tax burden in all but
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the last policy experiment. The model supports policymakers’ concerns of a potentially higher incidence of
poverty in rural areas resulting from higher energy taxes in developing countries. Agricultural workers, as
modeled, do not pay energy or labor taxes, but still bear part of the burden of green tax reform through
urban-rural migration effects. Specifically, in the first two policy experiments, a decrease in formal sector
employment is partially absorbed by the agricultural sector. This inflow of labor into rural areas pushes
down wages in the agricultural sector not only in absolute terms, but also relative to formal sector wages, so
that the incidence of poverty as measured by wages is higher. In the third and fourth green tax policies, a
higher burden of taxation imposed on informal-sector workers prompts them to escape the brunt of taxation
by searching for a formal-sector job or migrating into rural areas. Not all workers are able to find a job in the
formal sector, so some of them migrate into rural areas, which again pushes wages down in the agricultural
sector.
In the last environmental tax policy, compared with the third and fourth ones, the decline in the income
of agricultural workers is moderated. This is because there is a larger reduction in unemployment than
before, and as a result fewer people migrate into rural areas.
Green tax policies that put a heavier tax burden on the unemployed, as in the last three policy scenarios,
could still be attractive from an efficiency viewpoint, because they improve labor market incentives through
increased search effort, s. This search effort behavior introduces a wedge between labor market tightness θ
and the vacancy rate v in such a way that these variables move in opposite directions. More specifically,
since search intensity is endogenous, labor market tightness depends on two factors: the number of vacancies
relative to the number of unemployed workers (v/u), and the average search intensity of the unemployed (s):
θ =
v
u
1
s
(33)
In the first two policy experiments, the labor market is less tight because there are more unemployed workers
relative to the number of vacancies in the economy, and θ follows the dynamics of the first channel v/u and
falls. In contrast, in the last three policy scenarios, green taxation reduces payroll taxes and raises energy
taxes, which imposes a heavier burden on the unemployed by reducing their income from self-employment,
z. In these cases, the unemployed attempt to evade taxation by more actively seeking a formal-sector job,
so that s rises. A higher search intensity makes it easier for employers to fill vacancies, and the labor market
tightness, θ, by following the dynamics of search intensity s, falls. A less tight labor market reduces the
expected duration of vacancies (1/q(θ)) so that the green tax policy of the third and fourth scenarios creates
larger incentives to enter the formal sector, inducing labor reallocation from the informal to the formal sector
with a higher turnover rate than before.
4.3 Green tax policy reform and public consumption
As discussed above, by lowering the level of public consumption, it is possible to mitigate the overall tax
burden on labor and to increase private-sector after-tax income. In this section, I further discuss the mecha-
nisms and intuition behind this result. I consider different tax reforms, with increases in the energy tax rate
ranging from 0.75 percentage points to 25 percentage points from the baseline value of 15%. In each case I
start with the baseline tax level, vary the energy tax, and report the resulting steady-state results for the
fourth and fifth policy scenarios in Table 5.
There are several key results that emerge from the table. First, labor taxes and unemployment are
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reduced by more when G varies than when G is fixed. Second, changes in the income of the unemployed
from self-employment are almost identical under these two policies. Third, when G varies, formal sector
after-tax wages (wm), agricultural-sector wages (wa), and unemployment benefits (b) follow a hump-shaped
pattern with respect to the changes in energy tax rate: they are initially rising but start falling when the
energy tax rate reaches some level higher than the baseline value. Finally, there is a larger reduction in total
government revenues under the final policy scenario.
These results can be explained as follows. On the fiscal side, the combination of the payroll tax (albeit
lower than in the baseline) and higher carbon taxes reduces total government revenue under both policy
scenarios. This is because a reduction in payroll taxes does not outweigh the costs associated with a decrease
in energy demand (erosion in the energy tax base), or the costly reduction in labor productivity. Even though
labor employment expands, it does not offset the reductions in labor taxes, so that overall tax revenues
decline. This reflects the fact discussed earlier that labor taxes are a broader-based tax and thus are a more
efficient way of raising revenues than energy taxes. Under the fourth policy experiment, a larger reduction
in labor taxes results in even lower tax revenues, despite the higher after-tax wage of workers.
On the expenditure side, there are two components through which these revenue changes are transferred
to the rest of the economy: transfers to the unemployed and the provision of public goods. Changes in
spending on publicly provided goods, in particular a reduction in public consumption, allows for lower
public revenues and thus lower payroll taxes.
If, however, G is fixed, transfers to the unemployed have to be lower, public revenues higher, or a mix of the
two. As simulation results (Table 5) demonstrate, it is a combination of the two that occurs: unemployment
benefits are lower and total public revenues are higher under the policy when G is fixed compared to when G
varies. As mentioned earlier, public revenues are higher because there are smaller reductions in labor taxes.
Specifically, a 5% increase of the energy tax from the baseline value25 lowers the payroll tax by 1.45% when
G is fixed compared to 1.75% when G varies, whilst an increase in the environmental levy of 10% from the
baseline value enables a 2.86% decrease in labor taxes (compared to 3.47%).
The smaller cuts in labor taxes relative to increases in energy taxes under the third policy case is due
to the erosion of the carbon tax base. As discussed at the start of Section 4.3, to provide a fixed amount
of public goods, the government is unable to reduce taxes on labor sufficiently to offset the adverse effect
of a higher energy tax on private-sector after-tax income. Drops in labor taxes are due to the revenue
recycling of energy taxes, so to achieve “extra” reductions in marginal taxes on labor, the government needs
to resort to additional policy measures. A reduction in public consumption is one of those measures, as
a lower level of public spending requires less public revenues, and thus lower payroll taxes. Under the
baseline parameterization, the reduction in public consumption results in higher cuts on labor taxes relative
to increases in tax on energy, which results in higher real after-tax wages of formal-sector workers, as well
as the hump-shaped responses of wages and unemployment benefits (see Table 5).
To explain these results, following Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998b) I first define the change in the
tax burden on labor resulting from the green tax reform as:
τˆ ≡ τˆL + ωE
ωL
τˆe,m (34)
where changes in taxes are expressed as absolute deviations from their baseline values, and ωL = 0.5 and
ωE = 0.231 stand for shares of labor and energy in formal production respectively. Labor taxes raise wage
25From an energy tax of 15% to 15.75%.
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costs directly, whereas energy taxes indirectly raise wage costs per unit of production by discouraging energy
use and reducing labor productivity. Thus, equation (34) states that if the cut in payroll taxes is not
sufficient to compensate for these adverse effects of energy taxes, green tax policy raises the overall tax
burden, resulting in higher labor costs per unit of output, lower after-tax wages, or both. If a higher tax
burden is reflected in higher labor costs, then such a tax policy is likely to discourage the demand for labor
and thus reduce employment.
Given the parametrization of the model and these shares of labor and energy in the production process,
it is clear that if a reduction in labor taxes exceeds an increase in energy taxes, the tax burden of the green
tax reform is likely to be reduced. Specifically, the following condition must hold for the tax burden on real
after-tax private income to be lowered:
− τˆL
τˆE
>
ωE
ωL
= 0.462 (35)
Based on (34), column (9) of Table 5 presents estimates of the changes in the overall tax burden associated
with the green tax reform. “Extra” cuts in taxes on labor, stemming from a reduction in public consumption,
reduce labor costs per unit of output sufficiently to outweigh energy costs per unit of output associated with
a rise in energy tax from its baseline value. If, however, the green tax reform involves a relatively high
increase in energy tax, for example 20 percentage points, a reduction in labor taxes is no longer sufficient
to offset the adverse effects of energy taxes, and the average tax burden rises in the economy. This suggests
that the tax burden follows a J-curve pattern, initially falling before rising.
I argue that this J-curve behavior of the change in the tax burden is conceptually similar to the Laffer
curve (the non-monotonic relationship between tax rates and government revenues). Higher environmental
taxes induce firms to reduce their demand for energy, eroding the carbon tax base. The erosion in this tax
base is particularly high when energy tax rates exceed some higher level, so that a reduction in labor taxes
through revenue-recycling and a reduction in public consumption is not sufficient to offset the adverse effects
of higher energy taxes on labor productivity and energy demand, and the tax burden starts increasing. As
the level of the environmental levy becomes too high (e.g. when τe,m = 0.35), the government needs to
provide labor subsidies to induce firms to create more vacancies and to increase employment.
This result also implies that a reduction in public expenditure as a complementary policy measure to
reduce the tax burden of energy taxes in the economy has limited scope for improving outcomes. Reductions
in public expenditure can increase the after-tax income of the private sector only up to a certain level of
energy taxes, with further reductions in public consumption likely to be counterproductive.
Finally, reductions in public consumption not only translate into lower labor taxes, but also higher
transfers to the unemployed. The higher incomes of both unemployed and formal-sector workers compared
to the third policy case results in a larger urban area and lower rural-urban migration, which results in
higher rural-sector income. The only income that remains almost the same under the third and fourth policy
scenarios is income generated from informal-sector self-employment. This is because the first-order effects of
lower public consumption are on overall tax revenue and unemployment benefits. The effect on income from
informal activities is only through the effect on wages (wm) and labor taxes, which are reduced by more in
the last policy experiment; this is almost completely compensated by increases in after-tax wages.
Finally, these results depend critically on the value of the energy intensity of the formal sector production,
and thus the values of ωE and ωL. Specifically, equation (34) also states that the overall effect of changes
in both tax rates on the tax burden depends on the share of energy costs relative to labor costs in total
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production (ωE/ωL). If, for instance, the share of energy is smaller relative to the share of labor, then
a given cut in labor taxes lowers the overall tax burden, ceteris paribus. This also implies that a change
in the tax burden can be negative (even without these “extra” cuts in tax on labor stemming from lower
government expenditure). Column (9) of Table 5 for the case with fixed G illustrates this point: a green
tax policy associated with increases of energy tax rate from the baseline value by 0.75 and 1.5 percentage
points lowers the tax burden, but a lower tax burden does not translate into higher private-sector after-tax
income, which is lower than under the baseline policy. This suggests that a reduction in the tax burden is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for private-sector after-tax incomes to be improved through a green
tax reform. In the next section, I investigate how this pattern continues with lower values of ωE/ωL, and
the sensitivity of the J-curve behavior of the tax burden to different values of energy intensity.
5 Welfare analysis
Previous analysis revealed that green tax reforms can have positive employment effects and increase the
income of both formal and informal workers in the urban sector. However, it was shown that such policies
decrease agricultural-sector incomes, under both fixed and endogenous public spending. In this section, I
investigate whether a green tax reform is welfare-improving.
So far, the analysis has neglected the effects of changes in public spending on the rest of the economy. It
was shown that a green tax reform with endogenous public spending results in a higher employment rate,
higher increases in urban-sector incomes, and a lower reduction in agricultural-sector income compared to a
tax reform that keeps the level of public spending fixed. Clearly, if other economy-wide effects of a reduction
in public spending are taken into consideration, the former tax reform may not actually be superior to the
latter. As such, I account for the interaction of public spending with the rest of the economy by assuming
that public spending affects households’ utility, which for a given value of household income I is defined as
follows:
U(I) = cαAA cαMM Gϑ (36)
where αA + αM = 1, subject to the budget constraint
26:
pAcA + pMcM = I (37)
Households’ demand functions are given by the following equations:
cA =
αAI
pA
; cM =
αMI
pM
(38)
A measure of social welfare is defined as the weighted utilities of all agents (formal sector workers, informal,
and agricultural):
W = (1− u)LmU(wm + λP ) + uLmU(z + b) + LaU(wa) (39)
where U is the households’ utility function. The weighted utilities is a valid representation of social welfare
and has been used in previous studies27. In addition to this social welfare measure, I compute equivalent
26Market clearing conditions for agricultural goods and manufacturing goods determine the prices pA and pM . Please note
that the baseline values at τe,m will be different for this version of the model with welfare analysis compared to the baseline
values of the model considered earlier, because the model has been modified.
27For instance, Schneider (1997) uses similar measure of social welfare when he examines the welfare effects of environmental
tax reforms. In the macroeconomics literature, a similar weighted sum of per-period utilities is a typical specification of the
policy objective, as in Horvath (2009) and Bilbiie (2016).
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variation (EV ) for each agent in the economy to see if there are any situations when the urban workers, who
experience an increase in incomes, could potentially compensate the rural workers, who face declines in their
incomes due to a green tax reform.
I evaluate the welfare costs of two environmental tax reforms that result in a double dividend, which
are characterized by indexation scheme Case C, with fixed or endogenous public spending (fourth and fifth
tax reforms as in Table 4). These results are demonstrated in Table 6, which presents how welfare and the
utilities of each group of agents change for a given increase in the energy tax rate from its baseline value
τe,m = 0.15, as well as the equivalent variations of a given tax reform. Table 6 suggests that even though
green tax reforms are associated with an increase in all urban-sector incomes, a given environmental tax
policy reduces overall social welfare and the utility of each group of workers in the economy28. Furthermore,
comparing columns (2)-(4) across tables, we see that for a given level of environmental taxation, EV is
lower when public spending varies endogenously compared to when public spending is fixed, even though the
former policy is associated with a larger increase in incomes of both formal and informal workers, as discussed
in the previous section. As discussed earlier, the larger increase in urban-area incomes is possible due to
the reduction in public spending, which creates extra budgetary room. However, as I observe now, such
reductions in public spending are not desirable for society in general, since these relatively larger increases in
household incomes do not offset the reduction of public consumption, in terms of the well-being of workers.
6 Sensitivity analysis
6.1 Varying the energy intensity of the formal sector
In this section I investigate how the results presented in the previous section would change if I vary the value
of the expenditure share of energy in production. The baseline expenditure share of energy is ωE =0.231,
which as discussed in Section 3, is consistent with some estimates of energy intensity in manufacturing
subsectors across developing countries, but is much higher than the values of energy expenditure shares used
in recent macroeconomic models of climate change, which have used a value of 0.04. To accommodate these
differences in estimates, I consider values of the expenditure share of energy (1− α1 − α2 ≡ ωE) of between
0.1 and 0.04, while keeping the value of α1, the expenditure share of capital, at its baseline value of 0.269. I
start analyzing the effect of green tax reforms on the economy under three different values of energy share
ωE , by focusing on policy scenarios that assume the tax regime b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm, and G = G¯.
As before, I consider different tax regimes, with increases in the energy tax rate from its baseline value. In
each case I start with the baseline value, vary the energy tax and report the resulting steady-state results
for three alternative values of energy share in Table 7. Two key results emerge from the table. First, the
J-curve pattern of the change in tax burden associated with implementing green tax reforms can also be
observed for revenue-neutral tax reforms and not only for the case when G = ψY . Second, a reduction
in the unemployment rate (the double dividend phenomenon) can be associated with increases in after-tax
income of formal workers (wm) and the unemployed, particularly if the production process is more labor-
28The value of ϑ is crucial for welfare evaluation. The baseline value of ϑ is set at 0.1, while, as discussed earlier, the previous
literature suggests higher values of this parameter, 0.2 and 0.4. As such, I perform sensitivity analysis with respect to a higher
values of ϑ. The welfare costs of environmental tax policies depicted in Table 6 will be higher. Intuitively, and as could be
expected, with higher values of ϑ public spending plays more important role for the households’ utility and consequently the
reduction in public spending will be associated with larger welfare losses.
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intensive. Third, for a given rise in energy tax rate, cuts in payroll taxes are lower when production is less
energy-intensive.
Intuitively, with a smaller share of energy in production, declines in energy demand due to higher energy
taxes impose a smaller tax burden. At the same time, there are also fewer energy tax revenues that can
be recycled to cut payroll taxes, which have a wider tax base. This suggests that labor taxes can be cut
by less when the energy share is smaller. Despite smaller cuts in the labor tax rates, distortions associated
with green tax reforms are smaller, so that lower labor taxes can offset reductions in the marginal product
of labor due to lower energy demand. In such situations, the after-tax income of formal sector workers and
unemployment benefits increases.
The key difference from previous studies that focus on developed countries is that the incidence of
carbon taxes in the developing economy studied here is partly shifted to the rural sector through rural-urban
migration effects. Thus, even though revenue-neutral green tax policies can be associated with higher after-
tax incomes of both the employed in the formal sector and the unemployed, the income of rural workers is
lower under all cases considered. This highlights the importance of modeling features relevant for developing
countries, since ignoring rural-urban migration effects could potentially make green tax reforms appear
Pareto improving, when in fact, the policy trade-off is that the agricultural sector is made worse off in terms
of lower wages.
When endogenous changes in public expenditure accompany green tax reforms (under assumption G =
ψY ), the effect on both the unemployment rate (the double dividend) and private-sector after-tax income is
magnified by a further reduction in labor tax rates due to lower public consumption. Similar detailed results
are presented in Table 8, and changes in the tax burden are shown in Figure 1. As Figure 1 illustrates, a
decrease in government spending G leads to a larger decline in the tax burden for a given change in energy
tax rate (and a given energy share). I do not report a detailed table with the results under this policy
scenario (available upon request), but the patterns and messages are similar as when public consumption is
fixed29.
6.2 Worker’s bargaining power
As discussed earlier, the potential for a double dividend depends on how environmental taxation affects the
income of the unemployed (z + b), and hence the outside option of formal-sector workers. Double dividends
can arise if environmental regulation changes the outside option of formal-sector workers, so that some of the
higher burden of energy taxation can be shifted onto the unemployed. These implications were considered in
Case C (proportional unemployment insurance) in Section 2.2.5. If, however, environmental policy does not
affect the income of the unemployed (for example under fixed unemployment insurance), then the double
dividend does not occur.
Aside from the outside option, equilibrium wages of formal sector workers are also influenced by their
bargaining power due to the Nash bargaining assumption. As mentioned in Section 2.2.4, a higher bargaining
power means that formal sector workers can prevent larger cuts in after-tax wages, which raises labor costs
and reduces formal sector employment. However, if firms dominate the bargaining process, formal sector
wages will be closer to workers’ reservation wages (informal sector wages), so labor costs and employment
29Though with a larger decline in the tax burden, after-tax income of workers increases, whilst rural workers income fall by
less. The reduction in the unemployment rate is also larger.
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do not respond as much to energy taxation.
These results are demonstrated in Table 9, which presents the simulation results of the effects of environ-
mental regulation on unemployment, for different values of workers’ bargaining power: β = 0.5 (baseline),
β = 0.25, and β = 0.05. Here, we assume proportional unemployment insurance (UI) in the core model with
τa = 0.15, so it is possible to shift the burden of energy taxation onto the unemployed. Table 9 suggests that
there is a nonlinear relationship between the unemployment rate (u) and worker’s bargaining power (β).
Comparing columns (2) across tables, we see that for a given level of environmental taxation, unemployment
initially falls when bargaining power falls to 0.25, but then rises when bargaining power decreases further
to 0.05. A similar nonlinear pattern exists for formal-sector wages: comparing columns (4) across tables,
we observe that higher bargaining power is initially associated with relatively higher formal sector wages
(β =0.5 vs β =0.25), but when bargaining power decreases to 0.05, formal-sector wages become lower in
relative terms. Columns (3) and (6) show the informal sector (reservation) wage which, as mentioned earlier,
is closer to formal sector wages wm when bargaining power is lower.
6.3 The elasticity of search costs to search intensity
In the baseline model, the parameter φ represents the search cost elasticity with respect to search efforts and
is set to the value 2 as in Satchi and Temple (2009). The elasticity parameter φ affects migration decisions
through two channels: an increase in search intensity raises search costs as well as the probability of finding
a job. If φ is greater than 1, then the expected benefits from search, sσ′(s), exceed the costs, σ(s). Based
on the equilibrium migration condition (24), workers will therefore prefer to stay in the city rather than
migrating to rural areas.
The income of rural workers depends on the degree of urban-rural migration, so by varying the value
of φ, we examine how the search cost elasticity affects the distribution of the higher energy tax burden on
rural workers. We consider two alternative values: φ = 1.5 and φ = 3, assuming that energy taxes in the
agricultural sector are fixed at the baseline value of 0.15 and that the UI scheme is proportional. Table 10
presents the results for different values of φ and demonstrates that lower values of φ are associated with a
larger urban population and therefore a smaller rural population. The changing value of φ affects the income
of the unemployed z and unemployment benefits b, which together with σ[εσ − 1] influence urban-rural
migration. Under the given parametrization, with larger returns to urban labour, workers tend to migrate
to the city, which increases the income of agricultural workers.
6.4 Vacancy posting costs
Besides bargaining power and search costs, vacancy posting costs affect formal sector wages and the un-
employment rate. Higher vacancy costs means that fewer vacancies are posted, which results in a higher
unemployment rate. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the flow cost c to post a vacancy depends on hiring costs
ν, payroll taxes τL, and formal sector wages wm: c = ν(1 + τL)wm.
Table 11 presents the simulation results of the effects of environmental regulation on unemployment, for
different vacancy posting costs: ν = 0.4 (baseline), ν = 0.2, and ν = 0.6. For a given value of ν, an increase in
environmental taxation results in more vacancies being posted (and a lower unemployment rate) because the
fall in payroll taxes (column (1)) more than offset the increase in wages (column (3)). However, comparing
columns (2) across tables shows that for a given level of environmental taxation, the direct increase in flow
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costs due to an increase in ν leads to relatively higher unemployment, even though there are relatively more
vacancies, as the search intensity of workers is lower (not shown in the table).
6.5 A nested CES production function
The baseline model assumes an open capital account and a Cobb-Douglas specification of production function,
which is consistent with this assumption. Some developing countries, however, are more integrated with
financial markets than the others. In this section I investigate how the baseline results change for such
countries, by focusing on a CES representation of energy demand. Specifically, I repeat the simulations of
all four policy experiments when the production function in the formal sector is assumed to be a nested CES
production function as in (31). I discuss the main conclusions below.
In all policy experiments, the effects on variables are less pronounced, because with a lower elasticity
of substitution between labor and energy, imposing a carbon tax has a small impact on the relative cost
of labor, and consequently on labor demand and labor market outcomes. Another key result for the case
with a nested CES function is that the hump-shaped pattern of some variables under Case C (b = pibwm;
z = piz(1+τL)wm) and varying public consumption (Table 12) disappears
30. The low elasticity of substitution
between labor and energy, along with the imposition of energy taxes, do not allow the overall tax burden to
fall (for example, a 5% increase in energy taxes lowers payroll taxes by a tiny 0.48%, compared with 1.75% in
the baseline policy scenario with a Case C tax regime and varying public consumption), so the hump-shaped
pattern disappears.
The results point out that it is harder to reduce emissions with a lower elasticity, because of a smaller
decline in demand for energy. At the same time, the results also imply that green tax policies under a lower
elasticity are associated with higher public revenues and consequently with higher general public spending,
as the last column of Table 12 illustrates. The results are consistent with other studies that point out
the importance of the elasticity of substitution between energy and labor (capital) for the effectiveness of
emission reduction initiatives31.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I study the employment and welfare implications of environmental tax reforms, which are
accompanied by three alternative assumptions about public spending: (1) as part of a revenue-neutral
policy, (2) fixed, and (3) varying endogenously. The results demonstrate that, under a taxation scheme
that gives rise to a double dividend, a lower level of public spending is associated with a smaller negative
impact on the after-tax income of all households and a higher increase in employment, and the lowest level
of public spending occurs when it varies endogenously as a fraction of GDP. These green reforms, however,
still lead to a reduction in social welfare, and even more so in the case of endogenous public spending. As
30Simulation results of the first and third policy experiments with a nested CES production function are available upon
request.
31For example, Jorgenson et al. (2000), using a computable general equilibrium model for the US economy, IGEM, find that
rigidity in production (in a form of inability to substitute labor, capital, or other materials for energy) more than doubles the
costs of mitigation policies. The varying values of elasticity of substitution between energy and labor (capital) can also affect
the effectiveness of mitigation policies, with high inter-factor (between energy and value-added) and inter-fuel substitution
elasticities generating large carbon leakages.
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such, lower public spending as a complementary policy to improve the labor market effects of environmental
tax reforms in developing countries are likely to be unsuccessful. Policymakers should therefore look for
other alternative and more socially acceptable ways to reduce the tax burden on labor to support the
implementation of environmental tax reforms in developing countries.
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8 Appendix A
Country Unemployment benefits
Argentina ◦ earnings-related and declining after 4 months
◦ non-declining for shorter terms
◦ there are min. and max. values of benefits
Brazil earnings-related, but within ranges:
◦ previous income up to 767.6 BRL: 80% of the average wage
◦ 767,6-1279.46 BRL: 614.08 BRL+ 50% of the excess over 767 BRL
◦ previous income above 1279.46 BRL: 870.01 BRL
◦ there are min. and max. values of benefits
Chile earnings-related and descending:
◦ 50% of the renumeration the first month
◦ 45%, 40%, 35% and 30% in the following
Ecuador earnings-related:
sum set equal to 3 times the average salary of last 12 months
Uruguay earnings-related and descending:
for workers with monthly compensation and jobbers:
◦ 50% of wage over the last 6 months, in case of the suspension
◦ in case of a layoff 66%, 57%, 50%, 45%, 42% and 40% of the salary
◦ there are min. and max. values of benefits
Venezuela earnings-related:
◦ 60% the of average weekly wage of the last 50 weeks
◦ min. benefit is 60% of the minimum wage
Mexico no nationwide UI, flat-rate systems linked to the minimum wage
Table 1: Unemployment insurance systems in Latin America
Note: Sources: Velasquez (2010), Bosch and Campos-Vazquez (2010), Hijzen (2011). The information provided in
this table is based on the most recent available data on the latest reforms of unemployment insurance schemes: 1991
in Argentina (http://www.trabajo.gov.ar/segurodesempleo/), 2009 in Chile, 2001 in Ecuador, 2008 in Uruguay, 2005
in Venezuela (http://www.seguridadsocialparatodos.org/aysss/content/sud-america/venezuela.html), 2007 in Mexico
City. Values for Brasil are updated regularly (see, the website of Ministerio do Trabalho e Emprego, MTE, Governo
do Brasil). For Mexico see also: http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.do?tid=2667.
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Parameter Cobb-Douglas pr.f. CES pr.f.
Search model parameters
ν parameter of vacancy posting cost 0.40 0.4
s search intensity 0.5 0.5
φ search cost elasticity 2.00 2
β bargaining strength of workers 0.5 0.5
M matching function efficiency 0.1 0.1
zp indexation of severance pay to wage 3.36 3.36
Π search intensity parameter 3.14 3.14
γ matching function elasticity 0.50 0.50
λ monthly job separation rate 0.04 0.04
Other parameters
τe energy tax rate 0.15 0.15
r monthly interest rate 0.04/12 0.04/12
rm return on capital 0.04/12 0.04/12
α1 share of capital in formal sector production 0.269 -
γ1 share of capital in agricultural sector 0.63 0.63
α2 share of labor in formal sector production 0.5 -
α share of labor in formal sector production - 0.3
γ2 share parameter in the nested CES function - 0.1
ε elasticity of substitution btw capital/labor & energy - 0.05
Aa productivity in agricultural sector 1 1
Am productivity in urban sector 2 5.2
AE fossil energy-augmenting technology - 5.2
Table 2: Baseline parameter values.
Labor market characteristics Model Data Source
Agricultural employment share, La 0.13 0.13 Mexico 2010, World Bank
(SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS)
Unemployment (informal sector share), u 30.63% 34.1% Mexico 2009, LABORSTA, ILO
Formal sector wage/rural wage, wm/wa 2.09 1.93 Mexico (LABORSTA, ILO)
average 1995-2008a
Payroll tax rate, τL 0.25 0.19, 0.27 Mexico (2013) OECD
Average employment duration 18.11 mths 12-27 mthsb Mexico (1992,1993)
Gong and van Soest (2002)
Table 3: Labor market characteristics: data vs. model.
aThe number is calculated as the ratio of the monthly wage in the manufacturing sector and that paid in the agricultural
sector for all men and women. The respective ratio for Brazil in years 1994-2002 was 2.3, in Peru in years 1989-1993 1.73, in
Venezuela 1.40 in year 1997. Satchi and Temple (2009) use the number 1.80 based on ILO data for 1990. Given that data for
Mexico is most recent, I target the ratio 1.93 in my calibration.
bRespectively for men women and men.
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G Case u wm (b+ z) b z wa s θ
1. G = G¯ A: b = b¯ 0.75 -1.63% 0 0 0 -3.83% ↓ ↓
A: z = z¯
2. G = G¯ B: b = pibwm 0.28 -1.33% -1.33% -1.33% -1.33% -3.53% ↓ ↓
A: z = pizwm
3. revenue-neutral C: b = pibwm -0.78 -1.17% -4.58% -1.17% -5.46% -3.43% ↑ ↓
A:z = piz(1 + τL)wm
4. G = G¯ C: b = pibwm -0.86 -0.72% -4.48% -0.72% -5.45% -2.77% ↑ ↓
A:z = piz(1 + τL)wm
5. G varies C: b = pibwm -1.06 0.46% -4.23% 0.46% -5.44% -1.02% ↑ ↓
A: z = piz(1 + τL)wm
Notes: Green tax reform constitutes an increase in the energy tax rate from τe,m = 0.15 (baseline) to τe,m = 0.3;
the steady-state value of unemployment is already in percentage terms, so u =0.75 (under first policy experiment)
means that unemployment increased by 0.75 percentage points, from 30.63% (baseline) to 31.38%; changes in other
variables relative to their baseline values.
Table 4: Labor market effects of green tax reform under different tax regimes and assumptions about
government expenditure: A summary.
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(a) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when G is fixed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τE τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.1500 0.2500 3.2822 0.3063 1.3378 2.7964 1.1686 0.3017 0.5000 0.7386 0.6581
0.1575 0.2463 3.2813 0.3057 1.3364 2.7962 1.1652 0.3016 0.5013 -0.00015 0.7382 0.6581
0.1650 0.2428 3.2804 0.3052 1.3349 2.7959 1.1617 0.3016 0.5025 -0.00023 0.7378 0.6581
0.2000 0.2273 3.2761 0.3030 1.3274 2.7932 1.1461 0.3013 0.5082 0.00041 0.7362 0.6581
0.2500 0.2076 3.2703 0.3001 1.3149 2.7863 1.1249 0.3006 0.5156 0.00380 0.7336 0.6581
0.3000 0.1903 3.2647 0.2977 1.3008 2.7764 1.1049 0.2995 0.5222 0.00966 0.7307 0.6581
0.3500 0.1751 3.2594 0.2955 1.2855 2.7641 1.0860 0.2982 0.5281 0.01759 0.7276 0.6581
0.4000 0.1617 3.2544 0.2936 1.2692 2.7499 1.0681 0.2967 0.5334 0.02727 0.7243 0.6581
(b) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when G varies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τe,m τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.1500 0.2500 3.2822 0.3063 1.3378 2.7964 1.1686 0.3017 0.5000 0.7386 0.6581
0.1575 0.2456 3.2811 0.3056 1.3376 2.7979 1.1652 0.3018 0.5015 -0.00092 0.7371 0.6568
0.1650 0.2413 3.2800 0.3050 1.3374 2.7994 1.1617 0.3020 0.5031 -0.00175 0.7357 0.6555
0.2000 0.2223 3.2747 0.3023 1.3354 2.8046 1.1462 0.3026 0.5101 -0.00452 0.7290 0.6495
0.2500 0.1981 3.2672 0.2988 1.3307 2.8087 1.1250 0.3030 0.5192 -0.00569 0.7194 0.6408
0.3000 0.1766 3.2599 0.2957 1.3241 2.8093 1.1051 0.3031 0.5275 -0.00409 0.7099 0.6321
0.3500 0.1574 3.2528 0.2930 1.3160 2.8071 1.0862 0.3028 0.5351 -0.00014 0.7004 0.6235
0.4000 0.1402 3.2459 0.2905 1.3066 2.8026 1.0684 0.3023 0.5420 0.00577 0.6911 0.6151
Table 5: The effects of varying the energy tax rate under indexation scheme b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm
and when either G is fixed or G varies, under the baseline values of the labor share=0.5 and energy share
=0.231.
29
(a) The welfare effects when G is fixed.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
τe,m EVa EVm EVi u Um Ui Ua W
0.1500 0.3063 1.8628 0.8385 0.7630 1.4469
0.1575 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0010 0.3058 1.8624 0.8384 0.7628 1.4466
0.1650 -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0010 0.3053 1.8616 0.8380 0.7625 1.4460
0.2000 -0.0024 -0.0059 -0.0026 0.3031 1.8595 0.8370 0.7616 1.4442
0.2500 -0.0033 -0.0081 -0.0037 0.3004 1.8582 0.8365 0.7611 1.4421
0.3000 -0.0031 -0.0075 -0.0034 0.2981 1.8585 0.8366 0.7612 1.4404
0.3500 -0.0018 -0.0044 -0.0020 0.2961 1.8603 0.8374 0.7619 1.4388
(b) The welfare effects when G varies.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
τe,m EVa EVm EVi u Um Ui Ua W
0.1500 0.3055 1.8612 0.8378 0.7624 1.4462
0.1575 -0.0009 -0.0023 -0.0010 0.3057 1.8611 0.8378 0.7623 1.4461
0.1650 -0.0018 -0.0045 -0.0020 0.3051 1.8595 0.8371 0.7616 1.4453
0.2000 -0.0055 -0.0135 -0.0061 0.3023 1.8526 0.8340 0.7588 1.4420
0.2500 -0.0096 -0.0234 -0.0105 0.2988 1.8445 0.8303 0.7555 1.4376
0.3000 -0.0124 -0.0303 -0.0137 0.2957 1.8381 0.8274 0.7528 1.4337
0.3500 -0.0142 -0.0348 -0.0156 0.2930 1.8331 0.8252 0.7508 1.4301
Table 6: Welfare effects of a green tax reform. The model with b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm.
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(a) Labor share = 0.5 and energy share = 0.231 (baseline case).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τe,m τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.15 0.2500 3.2823 0.3063 1.3379 2.7965 1.1687 0.3017 0.5000 0.7386 0.6582
0.1575 0.2464 3.2814 0.3058 1.3365 2.7963 1.1652 0.3017 0.5013 -0.0002 0.7382 0.6582
0.165 0.2428 3.2804 0.3053 1.3350 2.7959 1.1618 0.3017 0.5026 -0.0002 0.7379 0.6582
0.2 0.2273 3.2762 0.3030 1.3274 2.7933 1.1462 0.3014 0.5083 0.0004 0.7362 0.6582
0.25 0.2076 3.2703 0.3002 1.3150 2.7864 1.1250 0.3006 0.5157 0.0038 0.7336 0.6582
0.3 0.1904 3.2647 0.2977 1.3009 2.7765 1.1050 0.2996 0.5222 0.0097 0.7307 0.6582
0.35 0.1752 3.2594 0.2955 1.2855 2.7642 1.0861 0.2982 0.5281 0.0176 0.7277 0.6582
0.4 0.1618 3.2545 0.2936 1.2692 2.7500 1.0681 0.2967 0.5334 0.0273 0.7244 0.6582
(b) Labor share = 0.631 and energy share = 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τe,m τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.15 0.2500 3.2083 0.3087 1.3379 3.6484 1.4903 0.4680 0.5000 0.8007 0.6750
0.1575 0.2487 3.2079 0.3086 1.3374 3.6485 1.4888 0.4680 0.5005 -0.00012 0.8006 0.6750
0.165 0.2474 3.2076 0.3084 1.3369 3.6485 1.4873 0.4680 0.5009 -0.00021 0.8005 0.6750
0.2 0.2417 3.2061 0.3075 1.3342 3.6483 1.4804 0.4680 0.5030 -0.00038 0.7997 0.6750
0.25 0.2343 3.2040 0.3065 1.3297 3.6469 1.4710 0.4678 0.5057 0.00010 0.7986 0.6750
0.3 0.2276 3.2021 0.3055 1.3245 3.6444 1.4620 0.4675 0.5082 0.00132 0.7974 0.6750
0.35 0.2215 3.2004 0.3046 1.3188 3.6408 1.4533 0.4670 0.5104 0.00318 0.7961 0.6750
0.4 0.2160 3.1987 0.3038 1.3127 3.6365 1.4451 0.4665 0.5125 0.00561 0.7947 0.6750
(c) Labor share = 0.691 and energy share = 0.04.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τe,m τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.15 0.2500 3.1746 0.3099 1.3379 4.3562 1.7608 0.5993 0.5000 0.8914 0.7299
0.1575 0.2495 3.1744 0.3098 1.3377 4.3563 1.7601 0.5993 0.5002 -5.07E-05 0.8914 0.7299
0.165 0.2490 3.1743 0.3097 1.3375 4.3563 1.7595 0.5993 0.5003 -9.38E-05 0.8913 0.7299
0.2 0.2469 3.1738 0.3094 1.3364 4.3564 1.7565 0.5993 0.5011 -0.0002 0.8910 0.7299
0.25 0.2441 3.1730 0.3090 1.3346 4.3560 1.7524 0.5993 0.5021 -0.0001 0.8905 0.7299
0.3 0.2415 3.1723 0.3086 1.3325 4.3552 1.7485 0.5992 0.5030 0.0002 0.8899 0.7299
0.35 0.2392 3.1717 0.3083 1.3302 4.3539 1.7447 0.5990 0.5039 0.0008 0.8893 0.7299
0.4 0.2371 3.1711 0.3080 1.3278 4.3524 1.7410 0.5988 0.5047 0.0016 0.8887 0.7299
Table 7: The effects of varying the energy tax rate under indexation scheme b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm
and when G = G¯, under different values of energy and labor shares.
31
(a) Labor share = 0.5 and energy share = 0.231 (baseline case).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τE τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.15 0.2500 3.2823 0.3063 1.3379 2.7965 1.1687 0.3017 0.4999 0.7386 0.6582
0.1575 0.2456 3.2812 0.3057 1.3377 2.7980 1.1652 0.3019 0.5016 -0.0009 0.7371 0.6569
0.165 0.2413 3.2800 0.3051 1.3374 2.7994 1.1618 0.3020 0.5031 -0.0017 0.7357 0.6556
0.2 0.2224 3.2748 0.3023 1.3355 2.8047 1.1462 0.3026 0.5101 -0.0045 0.7291 0.6495
0.25 0.1981 3.2673 0.2988 1.3308 2.8087 1.1251 0.3030 0.5193 -0.0057 0.7195 0.6408
0.3 0.1766 3.2599 0.2957 1.3242 2.8094 1.1051 0.3031 0.5276 -0.0041 0.7099 0.6321
0.35 0.1575 3.2528 0.2930 1.3160 2.8072 1.0863 0.3029 0.5351 -0.0001 0.7005 0.6236
0.4 0.1403 3.2460 0.2906 1.3067 2.8026 1.0684 0.3024 0.5421 0.0058 0.6911 0.6151
(b) Labor share = 0.631 and energy share = 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τe,m τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.15 0.25 3.2083 0.3087 1.3379 3.6484 1.4903 0.4679 0.49999 0.8007 0.6750
0.1575 0.2485 3.2079 0.3085 1.3378 3.6491 1.4888 0.4681 0.5005 -0.0003 0.8002 0.6746
0.165 0.247 3.2075 0.3083 1.3377 3.6497 1.4873 0.4682 0.5011 -0.0006 0.7997 0.6741
0.2 0.2404 3.2057 0.3073 1.3369 3.6523 1.4804 0.4685 0.5035 -0.0017 0.7973 0.6720
0.25 0.2316 3.2033 0.3061 1.3352 3.6547 1.4710 0.4688 0.5067 -0.0025 0.7937 0.6689
0.3 0.2237 3.2010 0.3049 1.3327 3.6559 1.4620 0.4689 0.5096 -0.0025 0.7902 0.6659
0.35 0.2165 3.1989 0.3039 1.3296 3.6559 1.4534 0.4689 0.5123 -0.0018 0.7866 0.6628
0.4 0.2099 3.1968 0.3029 1.3259 3.6550 1.4451 0.4688 0.5147 -0.00049 0.7831 0.6598
(c) Labor share = 0.691 and energy share = 0.04.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
τe,m τL θ u wa wm z b s τˆ gov rev G
0.15 0.2500 3.1746 0.3099 1.3379 4.3562 1.7608 0.5993 0.5000 0.891448055 0.7299
0.1575 0.2494 3.1744 0.3098 1.3379 4.3565 1.7601 0.5993 0.5002 -0.00012 0.8912 0.7297
0.165 0.2489 3.1743 0.3097 1.3378 4.3568 1.7595 0.5993 0.5003 -0.00023 0.8910 0.7295
0.2 0.2465 3.1736 0.3094 1.3375 4.3580 1.7565 0.5995 0.5012 -0.00065 0.8900 0.7287
0.25 0.2432 3.1728 0.3089 1.3368 4.3591 1.7524 0.5997 0.5024 -0.00099 0.8886 0.7275
0.3 0.2403 3.1720 0.3085 1.3358 4.3597 1.7485 0.5998 0.5035 -0.00106 0.8871 0.7262
0.35 0.2375 3.1712 0.3081 1.3345 4.3599 1.7447 0.5998 0.5045 -0.0009 0.8857 0.7250
0.4 0.2350 3.1705 0.3077 1.3330 4.3597 1.7411 0.5997 0.5054 -0.0005 0.8842 0.7238
Table 8: The effects of varying the energy tax rate under indexation scheme b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm
and when G = ψY , under different values of energy and labor shares.
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Figure 1: Change in tax burden for varying values in energy tax rate: different values of energy share,
b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm, G varies.
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(a) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when β = 0.5 (baseline).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τe,m τL u wm wm normal. wa z + b− σ
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 2.7965 1.0000 1.3379 0.5530
0.1575 0.2456 0.9979 2.7980 1.0005 1.3377 0.5466
0.165 0.2413 0.9959 2.7994 1.0011 1.3374 0.5403
0.2 0.2224 0.9869 2.8047 1.0029 1.3355 0.5122
0.25 0.1981 0.9755 2.8087 1.0044 1.3308 0.4755
0.3 0.1766 0.9655 2.8094 1.0046 1.3242 0.4424
0.35 0.1575 0.9566 2.8072 1.0038 1.3160 0.4124
0.4 0.1403 0.9486 2.8026 1.0022 1.3067 0.3851
(b) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when β = 0.25.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τe,m τL u wm wm normal. wa z + b− σ
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 2.4184 1.0000 1.3379 0.8223
0.1575 0.2457 0.9977 2.4197 1.0005 1.3378 0.8171
0.165 0.2415 0.9954 2.4209 1.0010 1.3376 0.8120
0.2 0.2228 0.9856 2.4251 1.0028 1.3361 0.7893
0.25 0.1989 0.9730 2.4283 1.0041 1.3320 0.7592
0.3 0.1776 0.9620 2.4286 1.0042 1.3259 0.7317
0.35 0.1587 0.9522 2.4265 1.0033 1.3182 0.7065
0.4 0.1417 0.9436 2.4225 1.0017 1.3092 0.6832
(c) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when β = 0.05.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τe,m τL u wm wm normal. wa z + b− σ
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 1.8828 1.0000 1.3379 1.4165
0.1575 0.2458 0.9984 1.8839 1.0006 1.3381 1.4155
0.165 0.2418 0.9969 1.8849 1.0011 1.3382 1.4144
0.2 0.2237 0.9900 1.8887 1.0031 1.3381 1.4090
0.25 0.2006 0.9811 1.8918 1.0048 1.3359 1.4007
0.3 0.1800 0.9733 1.8927 1.0052 1.3319 1.3920
0.35 0.1616 0.9663 1.8916 1.0047 1.3263 1.3828
0.4 0.1451 0.9600 1.8890 1.0033 1.3195 1.3733
Table 9: The effects of varying the energy tax rate under different values of the workers’ bargaining power
β. The model with b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm, varying G. Note: unemployment in (2) is normalized with
respect to its value at τe,m = 0.15. Column (4) reports formal sector wages relative to the baseline.
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(a) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when φ = 1.5.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τe,m τL u wa Lm
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 1.3379 0.8700
0.1575 0.2455 0.9964 1.3382 0.8700
0.165 0.2411 0.9929 1.3384 0.8701
0.2 0.2218 0.9776 1.3387 0.8701
0.25 0.1970 0.9584 1.3371 0.8699
0.3 0.1751 0.9417 1.3333 0.8693
0.35 0.1556 0.9270 1.3279 0.8684
0.4 0.1382 0.9141 1.3210 0.8674
(b) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when φ = 2 (baseline).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τe,m τL u wa Lm
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 1.3379 0.8700
0.1575 0.2456 0.9979 1.3377 0.8700
0.165 0.2413 0.9959 1.3374 0.8699
0.2 0.2224 0.9869 1.3355 0.8696
0.25 0.1981 0.9755 1.3308 0.8689
0.3 0.1766 0.9655 1.3242 0.8679
0.35 0.1575 0.9566 1.3160 0.8666
0.4 0.1403 0.9486 1.3067 0.8650
(c) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when φ = 3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τe,m τL u wa Lm
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 1.3379 0.8700
0.1575 0.2456 0.9985 1.3371 0.8699
0.165 0.2414 0.9970 1.3362 0.8697
0.2 0.2226 0.9904 1.3316 0.8690
0.25 0.1984 0.9820 1.3233 0.8677
0.3 0.1771 0.9747 1.3132 0.8661
0.35 0.1581 0.9681 1.3019 0.8642
0.4 0.1410 0.9622 1.2895 0.8622
Table 10: The effects of varying the energy tax rate under different values of the elasticity of search costs
with respect to search intensity φ. The model with b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm, varying G.
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(a) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when ν = 0.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τe,m τL u wm wa Lm v
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 2.9720 1.3379 0.8700 1.0000
0.1575 0.2456 0.9977 2.9736 1.3378 0.8700 1.0005
0.165 0.2413 0.9954 2.9752 1.3376 0.8700 1.0011
0.2 0.2222 0.9853 2.9810 1.3359 0.8697 1.0034
0.25 0.1977 0.9726 2.9855 1.3311 0.8690 1.0061
0.3 0.1761 0.9614 2.9864 1.3240 0.8678 1.0084
0.35 0.1568 0.9515 2.9842 1.3150 0.8664 1.0103
0.4 0.1396 0.9427 2.9795 1.3044 0.8647 1.0119
(b) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when ν = 0.4 (baseline).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τe,m τL u wm wa Lm v
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 2.7965 1.3379 0.8700 1.0000
0.1575 0.2456 0.9979 2.7980 1.3377 0.8700 1.0007
0.165 0.2413 0.9959 2.7994 1.3374 0.8699 1.0015
0.2 0.2224 0.9869 2.8047 1.3355 0.8696 1.0046
0.25 0.1981 0.9755 2.8087 1.3308 0.8689 1.0085
0.3 0.1766 0.9655 2.8094 1.3242 0.8679 1.0118
0.35 0.1575 0.9566 2.8072 1.3160 0.8666 1.0146
0.4 0.1403 0.9486 2.8026 1.3067 0.8650 1.0170
(c) The effects of varying the energy tax rate when ν = 0.6.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τe,m τL u wm wa Lm v
0.15 0.2500 1.0000 2.6850 1.3379 0.8700 1.0000
0.1575 0.2456 0.9981 2.6864 1.3376 0.8700 1.0009
0.165 0.2414 0.9962 2.6877 1.3373 0.8699 1.0017
0.2 0.2225 0.9881 2.6927 1.3353 0.8696 1.0054
0.25 0.1983 0.9776 2.6965 1.3307 0.8689 1.0100
0.3 0.1769 0.9684 2.6970 1.3245 0.8679 1.0140
0.35 0.1579 0.9602 2.6948 1.3170 0.8667 1.0174
0.4 0.1407 0.9528 2.6903 1.3084 0.8653 1.0204
Table 11: The effects of varying the energy tax rate under different values of vacancy posting costs, ν. The
model with b = pibwm, z = piz(1 + τL)wm, varying G. Note: the number of vacancies in (7) is normalized
with respect to its value at τe,m = 0.15.
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Taxes
τe,m τL θ u wm/wa wm z b s v G
0.1500 0.2500 3.5448 0.2981 1.7837 2.3864 1.0771 0.0856 0.4999 0.5285 0.5906
0.1575 0.2487 3.5446 0.2980 1.7847 2.3852 1.0755 0.0855 0.5004 0.5286 0.5907
0.1650 0.2475 3.5443 0.2978 1.7856 2.3842 1.0739 0.0855 0.5009 0.5287 0.5909
0.2000 0.2417 3.5429 0.2969 1.7900 2.3786 1.0665 0.0853 0.5030 0.5293 0.5917
0.2500 0.2334 3.5408 0.2957 1.7960 2.3714 1.0562 0.0850 0.5061 0.5300 0.5929
0.3000 0.2251 3.5386 0.2945 1.8019 2.3646 1.0460 0.0848 0.5092 0.5308 0.5939
0.3500 0.2167 3.5363 0.2933 1.8078 2.3582 1.0360 0.0846 0.5124 0.5315 0.5951
0.4000 0.2083 3.5339 0.2921 1.8136 2.3520 1.2969 0.0844 0.5156 0.5323 0.5962
Table 12: Effects of varying the energy tax rate: CES production function, G varies, b = pibwm, z =
piz(1 + τL)wm, baseline labor share =0.5 and energy share = 0.231.
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9 Technical appendix: not for publication
9.1 Balance of payments and government budget constraint equations
In this section I prove that the balance of payments equation is redundant in defining the steady-state
equilibrium of the benchmark model.
Government I assume that the government needs to finance an exogenously given stream of public goods
G as well as transfers to the unemployed:
G+ uLmb = τLwm(1− u)Lm
(
1 + ν
r + λ
q
)
+ τe,mpEem(1− u)Lm. (40)
We can rewrite the budget constraint by normalizing it with respect to the number of workers in the urban
sector:
g + ub = τLwm(1− u)
(
1 + ν
r + λ
q
)
+ τe,mpEem(1− u) (41)
where g ≡ G/Lm.
Balance of payments Aggregate consumption in the rural area amounts to Ca = waLa and aggregate
production of agricultural goods amounts to g(ka)La, so that the excess income in the rural area that exceeds
demand is used to rent capital that is fixed in the agricultural sector:
g(ka)La − Ca = raKa (42)
where Ka is the total stock of capital used in the agricultural sector. Given perfect competition in the
agricultural sector, equation (42) holds.
Aggregate private consumption in the city is the sum of consumption of the formally employed and the
unemployed:
C = wm(1− u)Lm + λP (1− u)Lm + uLmb+ uLmz (43)
The firm-level capitalized hiring costs amount to:
λ+ r
q
c =
λ+ r
q
νwm +
λ+ r
q
νwmτL (44)
where the second term is a payment to the government by a firm. The aggregate hiring costs are then:
λ+ r
q
νwm(1− u)Lm (45)
and the balance of payments in an economy implies that the excess of the aggregate income in the city over
the aggregate demand is used to import both capital and energy at the international markets:[
(1− u)LmAmf(km, em) + uLmz − λ+ r
q
νwm(1− u)Lm
]
− C −G =
pEem(1− u)Lm + rmkm(1− u)Lm (46)
By substituting the expression for C from (43) into (46) and dividing by Lm, we obtain:
(1− u)Amf(km, em)− wm(λ+ r)ν
q
(1− u)− G
Lm
− wm(1− u)− λP (1− u)− ub =
pEem(1− u) + rmkm(1− u) (47)
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Substituting G/Lm instead into the expression from the budget constraint (41), and dividing by 1 − u, I
obtain:
Amf(km, em)− wm(λ+ r)ν
q
− wm − λP − τLwm(1 + ν r + λ
q
)−
−τe,mpEem = pEem + rmkm (48)
which is exactly the wage determination equation derived as part of the steady-state equilibrium in the main
text:
Amf(km, em)− (1 + τe,m)pEem − rmkm = (1 + τL)wm
[
1 + (λ+ r)
ν
q
]
+ λP
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